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RECENT MARKET EVENTS AND THE
FOUNDATION FOR GLOBAL MARKET CRISES:

THE EXPERIENCE OF REPUBLIC NATIONAL
BANK*
Walter H. Weiner**
I will start with a very brief overview of Republic National
Bank ("Republic"), and particularly how Republic was affected
by the somewhat embarrassing events of the third and fourth
quarters of 1998. I will also explain the effects of the Russian
economy, adjustments to our capital under FASB-115,1 and
finally, our minuscule involvement in Long-Term Capital
Management ("LTCM").2 All of these events led to some
downgrading of Republic's senior debt.
* This speech was originally presented at the Derivatives and Risk
Management Symposium on Stability in World Financial Markets, held at
Fordham University School of Law on January 28, 1999.
** Former Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of
Directors, Republic New York Corporation and Republic National Bank of
New York [hereinafter Republic].

1. AccOUNTING FOR CERTAIN INVESTMENTS IN DEBT AND EQUrrY
SECURIMS, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 115 (Financial
Accounting Standards Bd. 1993) [hereinafter FASB-115]. FASB-115 requires,
inter alia, that securities held by an FDIC depositor which are not held to
maturity or held for trading must be marked to market on a quarterly basis,
with unrealized gains and losses excluded from earnings and reported as a
separate component of shareholders' equity. Id. In accordance with FASB
115, FDIC-supervised institutions are required to realize net unrealized gains
and losses on all available-for-sale securities as a separate component of
stockholders' equity in their quarterly call reports. Capital Maintenance, FDIC
Release, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,662 (1994) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 325).
2. On September 23, 1998, with the encouragement of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, fifteen major banks injected $3.625 billion into
Long-Term Capital Management, L.P. [hereinafter LTCM], a private
investment fund engaged in highly leveraged securities transactions based on
advanced mathematical models, to prevent its collapse and potential default
on an estimated $125 billion it had borrowed on $2.2 billion in capital. See
Anita Raghavan & Mitchell Pacelle, To the Rescue? A Hedge Fund Falters,so
the Fed PersuadesBig Banks to Ante Up; Finnsto Lend $3.6 Billion as LongTerm Capital Loses on its Bond Bets, WALL ST. J., Sep. 24, 1998 at Al
(reporting on an "extraordinary gathering" in which the Federal Reserve
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Republic started with a single retail branch in 1966, with $11
million of capital. At December 31, 1998, our total shareholders'
equity was $3.14 billion.' Republic was the twenty-first largest
banking company in the United States as of September 30, 1998.
Republic has achieved a reputation for safety, conservatism,
liquidity, capital strength, and earnings consistency that is at the
pinnacle of banking. Prior to a downgrade by Moody's Investors
Service and Standard & Poor's, Republic enjoyed superior debt
rating.
We lost these ratings because of three specific
occurrences that converged in the third quarter of 1998.
Of those three reasons, the most significant was the loan
default by Russia, which resulted in a $92.7 million loss to
Republic for the, third quarter. In lending to Russia, we thought
we were building a serious bank for the long pull in Russia. We
had a history of dealing with the Soviet Union in precious metals,
bank notes, and other trading. We started correspondent
Bank of New York persuaded large banks to invest over $3.5 billion in LTCM
in return for a 90% ownership stake, and to prevent a financial crisis should it
unwind its positions); Steven Mufson, What Went Wrong? Fund'sBig Bettors
Learned that Risk Trumps Math, History, WASH. POST, Sep. 27, 1998, at Hi
(corrected Sep. 29, 1998) (listing fourteen major banks and institutions which
invested a total of $3.6 billion); Steven Syre, Fleet, BankBoston in Syndicate
Backing Troubled Hedge Fund,BOSTON GLOBE, Sep. 26, 1998, at Fl (reporting

that Fleet Financial Group had loaned $25 million to LTCM as part of the
bail-out); Joseph Kahn & Peter Truell, Troubled Investment Fund's Bets Now
Estimated at $1.25 Trillion, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 26, 1998, at Al (citing financiers'
estimates that LTCM had leveraged borrowings of $125 billion into $1.25
trillion in open trading positions). For comprehensive information on LTCM's
background and near-collapse, see Michael Lewis, How the Eggheads Cracked;
N.Y. TuMs, Jan. 24, 1999, § 6, at 24; Carol J. Loomis, A House Built on Sand,
FoRTuNE, Oct. 26, 1998, at 110; Michael Siconolfi, Anita Raghavan & Mitchell
Pacelle, All Bets are Off. How the Salesmanship and Brainpower Failed at
Long-Term Capital; WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1998, at Al.
3.
REPUBLIC NEw YoRK COPORAMaON, ANNUAL REPORT ON FoRM io-K 57
(Dec. 31, 1998). Approximately $3.12 billion of that amount reflects total
shareholder's equity in Republic National Bank of New York, the banking
subsidiary of Republic New York Corp. Id. at 61.
4. See Timothy L. O'Brien, The Market Turmoil: The Banks-Republic
Says Loss in Russia Will Erase Quarter'sProfits, N.Y. Tnvs, Aug. 28, 1998, at
D6 (noting that the charge Republic planned to take in the third quarter of
1998 due to losses on investments in Russia would wipe out Republic's third
quarter earnings).
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banking there in 1992, we opened a representative office in 1994,
and we had a full bank subsidiary by 1996. We were one of three
U.S. banks that owned a bank in Russia; the other two were
Citibank and Chase Manhattan Bank. Then, the Russians did
what to us was the unthinkable-they defaulted on domestic
debt.' We anticipated a cross-border debt default, but not a
domestic default in Russia. During the fourth quarter of 1998
and the first few weeks of 1999, there were substantial recoveries
and improvements in the value of the Russian securities. Had
these improvements occurred sixty to ninety days earlier,
Republic's losses that quarter would have been substantially
reduced or eliminated. After the Russian default, there was a
flight to quality, and much volatility in emerging markets
securities. Prices were driven down to the point that FASB-115
required a reduction of our capital.6
Notwithstanding the Russian default and downgrading of
Republic's senior debt, the single item that raised the eyebrows
of the rating agencies most was Republic's exposure to hedge
funds. At September 30, 1998, Republic's total exposure to
hedge funds, both collateralized and unsecured, was $165 million,
less than 0.3 percent of our total assets. However, LTCM was
among the hedge fund names. The rating agencies asked what a
conservative bank like Republic was doing in LTCM; that
question alone was enough to influence our downgrading another
notch. LTCM repaid 100 percent of its debt to Republic before
the end of 1998, and less than sixty days after the downgrade, we
no longer had exposure to LTCM.

5. See Regimes in a Fix: Adjustable Exchange Rates and Free Capital
Flows Do Not Mix. If Crises Are to be Avoided, Countries Must Choose
Between Them, FiN. TImEs, Aug. 19, 1998, at 18 (noting that the Russian
government caused a general default through a combination of restructuring
its domestic debt, imposing capital controls, and putting a ninety-day
moratorium on foreign commercial debts).
6. See supra note 1 (discussing the impact of FASB-115 on capital

reporting).
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OVERVIEW OF LTCM

I thought it would be interesting to go into some of the
details of Long-Term Capital's saga and how it affected Republic.
There are three articles that I would like to recommend to give
you an overall background: a Wall Street Journal article by
Michael Siconolfi,7 a New York Times Magazine Section article by
Michael Lewis,8 and an article by Carol Loomis in Fortune All
of these articles provide an accurate picture of how LTCM grew,
its strategy, and what ultimately happened.
Republic's total loan commitment to LTCM was $85 million,
and the outstanding balance never exceeded about 80 percent of
that commitment. To put this in perspective, note that by the end
of 1997, capital additions and reinvested earnings increased
LTCM's total capital to almost $7 billion, which had a negative
impact on their earnings as a percentage of capital. LTCM
forced investors to take back about $2 billion of that capital,
which made some investors quite unhappy, because it meant that
they would miss part of those incredible earnings. In 1994, after
only ten months of operation, LTCM earned 20 percent on
capital; 43 percent in 1995, 41 percent in 1996; and in 1997, as a
result of having too much capital, they earned 17 percent on
capital.
LTCM had very little month-to-month volatility, although it
was highly leveraged. Press reports say the leverage was twenty
to thirty times capital on-balance-sheet; with off-balance-sheet
and open trades, it could have been more than 250 times capital,
or $1 trillion. Some reports say there could have been 1,000
times leverage.
LTCM's investment strategy was to do hedge trades based on
small premiums, or discounts, which diverged from the market on
similar instruments, but the divergence would close out upon the
7. Michel Siconolfi, All Bets Are Off. How the Salesmanship and
BrainpowerFailedat Long-Term Capital,WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1998, at Al.
8. Michael Lewis, How the Eggheads Cracked,N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 24, 1999,
sec. 6, at 24.
9. Carol Loomis, A House Built On Sand; John Meriwether's OnceMighty Long-Term CapitalHas All but Crumbled. So Why Did Warren Buffet
Offer to Buy It?, FoRTUNE, Oct. 26,1998, at 110.
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maturity of the trades. It was basically a very conservative
strategy. LTCM told its investors that according to its computer
models, the probability of losing twenty percent or more of
capital was insignificant, only a one in one-hundred chance.
Many large players, such as Salomon Brothers and Goldman
Sachs, mimicked LTCM's strategy by copying, as closely as
possible, each LTCM trade that they could recognize.
WHY DID REPUBLIC LEND TO

LTCM?

The only way that Republic could gain access to equity
participation in LTCM for some of our better customers was to
become part of the lending syndicate. That was also the way we
could become a trading partner of LTCM, by trading in foreign
exchange, and emerging market securities, and perhaps some
precious metals.
But, to enter the club you had to play by LTCM's rules. The
terms were non-negotiable-take it or leave it. Provisions to
protect creditors, normally included in loan agreements, were
often missing or very limited in LTCM's loan agreements.
Republic joined the crowd in a small way, and like others, we
may have been mesmerized by these "supermen." Their results,
after all, were hard to question.
TlE EVENTS WIcI LED TO LTCM's NEAR-COLLAPSE

As a delayed reaction to the Asian crisis, markets became
more volatile in the spring of 1998.0 In May and June, LTCM
lost about sixteen percent of its capital, but it was still no great
impact. Non-directional strategy and hedging were still at the
heart of its business, and the market was comfortable with that
strategy. In July 1998, Salomon Smith Barney began to liquidate
a large amount of its proprietary portfolio, especially those
instruments that were based upon LTCM's non-directional hedge
10. See, e.g., Greenspan Warning on Asia/Tells Congress Impact on U.S.
Now Being Felt, NEWSDAY (New York), May 22, 1998, at A71 (reporting that
the Asian financial crisis was beginning to significantly affect the U.S.
economy).
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strategies.1' Despite this event, LTCM did not incur significant
losses until after July.
In August 1998, Russia defaulted,12 and with the flight to
quality that followed in the fixed-income and equity markets,
many trading houses had large losses.13 Hedge funds increased
liquidations to meet margin calls, dealers stopped making
markets or bid large discounts, the spreads that were the basis of
LTCM's strategy widened to the point that it did not have
enough capital to carry the marked-to-market losses, and the
downward spiral became a whirlwind. LTCM reported a fortyfive percent loss in August 1998, which was fifty-two percent
year-to-date.
On September 22, 1998, LTCM drew down $500 million
under its revolving credit agreement in order to satisfy a demand
for additional margin deposits, as required by Bear Stearns,
LTCM's main clearing broker. On the next day, LTCM
attempted to draw down the remaining $400 million of its $900

million revolving credit.

Some revolving credit syndicate

members, including Republic, began to object, claiming that
LTCM was in default under the revolving credit agreement. By
the end of September, with LTCM's capital down by eighty-five
percent, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York-let's say
"invited"-a consortium of fourteen banks and securities
companies to invest $3.6 billion of new capital in LTCM, to save
the situation and protect against a meltdown.'
11. See Peter Truell, The Markets; Salomon Set to End Group on
Arbitrage, N.Y. TImEs, July 7, 1998, at D1 (reporting on Salomon Smith
Barney's decision to disband its bond arbitrage group in a shift away from
proprietary trading).
12. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing Russia's general
default in August 1998).
13. See, e.g., More Firms Attribute Losses to Troubled Russian Markets;
Finance: Citicorp, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter and Bankers Trust are Latest to
be Affected, L.A. Tuivms, Sep. 2, 1998, at D3 (reporting heavy losses by several
investment banks due to Russia's default).
14. Fourteen banks invested a total of $3.6 billion in LTCM, and were later
joined by a fifteenth bank, which loaned $25 million to LTCM. See Steven
Mufson, supra note 1, at HI (listing the fourteen major banks and institutions
which invested $3.6 billion in return for a ninety percent equity stake); Steven
Syre, supra note 1, at F1 (reporting that Fleet Financial Group subsequently
loaned $25 million on a $50 million credit line to LTCM).
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Republic's objection to the draw-downs was based primarily
on a negative covenant contained in the revolving credit
agreement. The issue was whether LTCM could validly draw on
its revolving credit agreement during September 1998, with the
following circumstances in existence: LTCM had reported that
by August 31, 1998, it had lost fifty-two percent of its December
31, 1997 capital. In a September 1, 1998 letter announcing its loss
to its lending syndicate and others announcing the loss, LTCM
acknowledged that "absent any change in relevant facts between
the end of August and the end of September 1998, there would
result an event of default." Under those circumstances, no draws
under the revolving credit could be made.
As to whether a default actually existed, the language of the
revolving credit agreement is clear. There is an event of default if
LTCM permits partners' capital on any date to be less than fifty
percent of the amount of partners' capital at the end of the prior
year. The language does not appear to be very complicated. To
Republic, "on any date" meant on any date, not just at quarter
ends. The legal question however was, "Could there be a draw
under the revolving credit agreement and a cross-default clause
under a note purchase agreement to which Republic was a party,
or had defaults been triggered?"

The result was a compromise, the way things often end up in
business. The compromise agreement was that the $900 million

revolving credit agreement was amended and the maximum
amount of the credit was reduced to $500 million. Most
importantly, the original expiration dates, which were May 28,
1999 under the revolving credit agreement and December 12,
2000 under the note purchase agreement, both became
December 31, 1998. The loans under both agreements became
very short term, and there was a high level of comfort from the
almost $4 billion of new capital that was infused. In any event, all
of the advances under the revolving credit agreement and under
the notes were fully repaid on December 11, 1998.
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In late September, the Federal Reserve made the first of
three reductions in the Federal funds rate. 5 These helped return
stability and liquidity to the global capital markets. It reduced
the flight to quality, stabilized the LTCM portfolio, and reversed
the losses. It reminds me of the early 1990s, when the Fed
reduced short-term rates while leaving the long-term yields high,
thereby pumping enormous profits into a sick, capital-short
banking sector.
It has been reported that by the end of November 1998,
the $3.625 billion of new capital had increased by approximately
$400 million in that two-month period, a tidy sixty-six percent per
annum rate of return. 6 Once again, short-term, quarter-toquarter swings in a highly volatile market resulted in a grotesque
result, which could have been made to appear level and normal if
someone had just rolled the calendar forward about sixty days.

15. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank System made
three 0.25% cuts to the federal funds interest rate within seven weeks in the
fall of 1998. See Jacob M. Schlesinger & David Wessel, Fed Cuts Short-Term
Rates by 0.25 Points, First Cut Since January '96 is a Pre-Emptive Strike to
Stave off Recession, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1998, at A3 (first cut); Jacob M.
Schlesinger & David Wessel, Fed Cuts Interest Rates a Quarter Point in a
Surprise Move to Shore up Markets, Greenspan'sDecision Sparks Stock and
Bond Rallies; Blue Chips Surge 330.58, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1998, at A3
(second cut); Jacob M. Schlesinger, Fed Moves to Reduce InterestRates Again,
CentralBank Clearly Signals the Quarter-PointCut May be Last for a While;
WALL ST. J., Nov. 18,1998, at A3 (third cut).
16. See Michael Siconolfi, SEC ProbesHedge Fund'sDisclosure,WALL ST.
J, Dec. 8, 1998, at C1 (reporting that LTCM registered profits of $400 million
since its bail-out).

